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In this paper we calculate the technical efficiencies, based upon multiple outputs - 
school exam performance and attendance rates - of all secondary schools in England 
over the period 1993-97. We then estimate models to examine the determinants of  
efficiency in a particular year, and the determinants of the change in efficiency over 
the period. Our results suggest that the greater the degree of competition between 
schools the more efficient they are. The strength of this effect has also increased over 
time which is consistent with the evolution of the quasi-market in secondary 
education. Competition is also found to be an important determinant of the change in 
efficiency over time. There is, however, some evidence of conditional convergence 
between schools.     
 
 




The election of a Labour Government in 1997 has rekindled the debate about the 
quality of secondary schooling in the UK. A recent White Paper proposes the 
introduction of Education Action Zones in the most deprived areas of the country to 
increase equality of opportunity (DfEE, 1997). However, raising the educational 
performance of pupils is to be achieved primarily through improvements in individual 
schools rather than through a radical transformation of the education system. In fact, 
the so-called quasi-market in secondary education, initiated by the previous 
Conservative administration, will be left virtually intact (see Section II).  
 
The need to raise educational standards in secondary schools is clearly important 
because a large stock of poorly educated and unqualified workers has a number of  
macroeconomic effects, such as lower productivity and growth (Prais, 1995; 
O'Mahoney, 1998).  There have been numerous microeconometric studies which have 
also shown that a poor education decreases the probability of obtaining employment, 
reduces the chance of acquiring vocational skills and leads to lower lifetime earnings 
(Andrews and Bradley, 1997; Green, 1993 and Makepeace, 1994).  
 
The Labour Government takes the view that a poor education traps individuals and 
families in a cycle of deprivation and poverty (DfEE, 1997). Poor performance at 
school leads to labour market disadvantage which places the individual at greater risk 
of poverty, and potentially to the transmission of negative attitudes towards education 
between successive generations (see Social Exclusion Unit, 1998; Home Office, 
1997). Moreover, the Home Office report lists poor discipline at school, truancy and 
exclusion as key factors which determine youth crime.
1 One possible way of breaking 
the cycle of deprivation is to simultaneously raise exam performance and change the 
attitude of pupils and parents to schooling. Consequently, schools must pay due 
attention to their exam performance and their attendance record since both can result 
in economic and social benefits.     
 
This paper has two broad aims. The first is to measure the efficiency of all secondary 
schools in England in terms of the joint maximisation of exam performance and the 
attendance rate (one minus the truancy rate), given various inputs. Because we have 
panel data on school performance, we are also able to observe how school efficiency 
has changed over time. Secondly, we seek to explain in a regression framework 
variations in efficiency between schools at several points in time (1993 to 1998), and 
the change in efficiency over the period. The regressors used in the second stage of   4
the analysis refer to the type of school, the extent of competition between schools in 
the catchment area, local environmental variables, including the unemployment rate, 
and Local Education Authority (LEA) expenditure on teachers and books. The results 
of our analysis have particular relevance to the current debate about school 
performance, the determination of Educational Action Zones and education policy in 
general. Furthermore, our own work represents an advance on previous work in that 
we measure and then seek to explain the relative efficiency of all secondary schools 
in England. Previous work has either been highly aggregated, focusing upon the 
efficiency of LEAs, or has adopted a case study approach based upon schools within a 
limited geographical area (see Table 1).  Our approach also pays full attention to the 
view that schools are multi-product organisations who may therefore be successful, or 
efficient, in a variety of ways.                    
            
The paper is organised as follows. In section I we discuss the changes to the 
secondary school sector over the last 15 to 20 years, paying particular attention to the 
way in which the quasi-market has evolved. This is followed in Section II by a 
description of the methodology used for measuring the efficiency of each school and 
the econometric approach adopted for the analysis of the determinants of efficiency. 
Dovetailed into this discussion is a detailed review of the relevant literature. In 
section III we describe the data used in the analysis and illustrate how efficiency 
varies with school and local environmental characteristics. Section IV presents our 
econometric results. We end with our conclusions.       
 
 
I.   THE EMERGENCE OF THE QUASI-MARKET 
The thrust of education policy over the last 15 years or more has been to create a so-
called quasi-market in secondary education. Various reforms, culminating in 1988 
with the implementation of a major piece of legislation, the Education Reform Act 
(ERA), have meant that schools are now in direct competition for pupils (Le Grand, 
1991; Bartlett, 1993).  School choice was increased by giving parents greater freedom 
to choose between secondary schools. Good schools are expected to grow in size and 
flourish, whereas poor schools would either wither and close, or react by introducing 
strategies to raise performance. The logic underpinning the quasi-market is therefore 
that the increase in  competition between schools will lead to an overall improvement 
in the quality of education provision, especially in terms of examination results.    
 
To facilitate the creation of a quasi-market, several initiatives were introduced which 
affected both the providers of education (i.e. schools - the supply-side) and the   5
consumers of educational services  (i.e. parents and pupils - the demand-side). On the 
supply-side the mix of school types was changed with the introduction of Grant 
Maintained schools and City Technology Colleges, both of which are outside of the 
control of the LEA. All school managers were given greater freedom over the 
allocation of their resources with the introduction of the Local Management of 
Schools (LMS) initiative. Schools now have a management team responsible for 
school finance and strategy. The LMS initiative has forced schools to become more 
efficient in the use of resources, and has also made them more responsive to 
consumers (Jackson 1994). Acting as a check upon school autonomy, 'parent-power' 
has increased within schools via the governing body. Parents now have a greater 
impact upon teacher recruitment, resource allocation and curriculum content than was 
hitherto the case.   
 
The introduction of open-enrolment has changed the demand side of the market by 
affording parents greater power in the choice of secondary school. Prior to the 
reforms, the LEA had the prime responsibility for allocating pupils to schools to 
ensure a minimum level of resource utilisation, which in effect meant that the less 
popular schools were ensured a share of the pupil population. Parents also found their 
children being channelled, sometimes against their will, to less popular schools even 
though  places were available at the school of first choice. A policy of open enrolment 
means that good schools are now able to increase their share of the pupil population 
subject only to the contraints imposed by their short-run physical capacity
2. This has 
been reinforced by the introduction of formula funding whereby money now follows 
pupils, and is calculated primarily on the basis of an age-weighted school population 
(Bartlett 1993, Jackson 1994). School managers therefore have a financial incentive to 
increase their pupil numbers and so the school's market share.
3 Furthermore, non-
selective schools facing an excess demand for places may respond by creaming off 
the best applicants to maintain their exam performance (see Millington and Bradley, 
1998 and Bradley et al, 1999). Increasing parental choice has necessitated an increase 
in the quantity and quality of information on school performance. This has been 
provided through the annual publication of the School Performance Tables by the 
Department for Education and Employment (DfEE). Each school's performance in 
public examinations and on measures of truancy are highlighted.  
 
The reforms to the secondary school sector have removed the barriers to, and 
increased the incentives for, competition between schools. However, schools may see 
the relationship between exam performance and attendance as a trade-off. Schools 
may therefore compete in a two-dimensional space, the quality of their output being   6
measured by both attendance and exam performance. The School Performance Tables 
have focused parental attention upon the upper end of the GCSE exam distribution, in 
particular the proportion of 5 or more A*-C grades, which may have led some schools 
to give less attention to pupils at the lower end of the distribution. This may lead to 
higher truancy rates, because of lower levels of monitoring, and the worst offenders 
may be discouraged from registering for exams or be excluded from school. In this 
scenario attendance rates may fall but exam performance may appear to rise.   
 
Figures 1a and 1b show the relationship between exam performance and truancy. 
They suggest that schools who wish to achieve high exam performance may  do so by 
increasing the attendance rate, since those schools with a high truancy rate have much 
lower exam performance. This runs counter to the view that a trade-off exists.
4 A joint 
maximising strategy is therefore preferable. Figure 2 plots the relationship between 
examination performance and the exclusion rate. There is little evidence that the best 
performing schools exclude pupils to improve their published exam performance in 
the school league tables. As one might expect, the schools with the lowest exam 
performance have the highest exclusion rates. 
5 
 
In view of this, it is pertinent to ask two questions. First, which schools are most 
efficient at maximising (some summary measure of) exam performance and the 
attendance rate? Secondly, what factors determine that efficiency?          
 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Economists typically view educational outcomes as a function of a variety of school 
inputs, including school expenditures, pupil-teacher ratios, teacher experience, the 
prior attainment of pupils, peer group pressures and family background (Hanushek, 
1976, 1992).  However, there has been limited success in finding a causal link 
between school inputs and educational outcomes. Early work on the education 
production function concluded that ‘teachers and schools differ dramatically in their 
effectiveness’ but that there is ‘no strong or systematic relationship between school 
expenditures and student performance’ (Hanushek, 1976, p.1159 and p.1162). The 
result that pupil-teacher ratios do not negatively affect performance is counterintuitive 
(Correa, 1993), but has proved to be remarkably robust (Betts, 1995; Akerhielm, 
1995).
6 However, Bradley and Taylor (1998) do find a consistent, positive, effect of 
school size on exam performance, after controlling for a large number of school 
inputs and pupil characteristics. Millington and Bradley (1998) also show that the 
greater the degree of competition between non-selective secondary schools, the higher 
a school's exam performance. The presence of selective schools in the catchment area   7
depresses the exam performance of non-selective schools because they admit the most 
able pupils. This is the so-called cream-skimming effect.     
  
Previous research has also shown that pupil characteristics, such as gender and innate 
ability (Feinstein and Symons, 1997), socio-economic background (Coleman Report, 
1966; Rutter et al, 1979; Feinstein and Symons, 1997) and family size (Loeb and 
Bound, 1996) tend to have a greater effect on exam performance than school inputs. 
Girls, pupils from smaller families and high income families tend to perform better in 
exams. Peer groups also exert an effect on performance through the transmission of 
academic values (Robertson and Symons, 1996).   
 
Relatively little research has been undertaken on the determinants of truancy. 
Bosworth (1994) does show, however, that the propensity to truant is greater than it  
otherwise would be if the pupil is male, has many siblings, or comes from a socially 
or economically disadvantaged family. In addition, the availability of career advice 
and attitudes to school, both of which are likely to be endogenous variables, appear to 
have a plausible effect on truancy.   
 
Closely related to the analysis of education production is the analysis of education 
costs, which is viewed as the dual of the production function. Early work on this 
focused upon single-school districts (Riew, 1966 and Cohn, 1968) but more recent 
studies emphasise the multi-product nature of educational institutions (for instance, 
Cohn et al., 1989 and de Groot et al., 1991). Multi-product cost functions are usually 
estimated using OLS, though the most recent studies employ stochastic frontier 
methods (for instance, Johnes, 1998). This is because the production and cost 
functions of theory are constructed on the premise that technical inefficiency is 
absent, which is not the case in practice.
7  
 
The stochastic production frontier method (Aigner et al., 1977) has the drawback that 
it can only deal with single outputs, but has over OLS the advantage of dividing the 
error term into two components; measurement error and technical inefficiency. This 
parametric approach poses a number of problems in the context of an education 
production (or cost) function. In particular, and as the cost function literature 
suggests, schools cannot legitimately be said to produce just one output. Moreover, 
the multiplicity of outputs produced by a school cannot be aggregated into a single 
measure in any meaningful way. While a multi-product profit maximising firm in a 
competitive industry can use market prices as weights in aggregating its costs and 
revenues, a school is neither profit maximising nor fully competitive, and market   8
prices are inevitably absent. In this context, an alternative to parametric frontier 
models, namely data envelopment analysis (DEA) provides an attractive means of 
locating the production possibility frontier and hence evaluating the technical 
efficiency of schools. 
 
In common with parametric frontier models, DEA has its roots in the work of Farrell 
(1957). But the seminal contribution is that of Charnes et al. (1978). Since then, the 
use of the method has become increasingly widespread, and applications have 




The simplest variant of DEA is a constant returns to scale model in which n decision-
making units produce s distinct output types using m distinct inputs. The quantities of 
outputs and inputs which the kth decision-making unit produces and consumes 
respectively are denoted by Yrk, r = 1, ... , s, and Xik, i = 1, ... , m. The kth decision 
making unit then chooses its vector of input weights, vik, i = 1, ... , m, and output 
weights, urk, r = 1, ... , s, with the aim of maximising its weighted sum of outputs 
subject to a number of constraints. These are that: (i) the chosen weights are such that, 
when applied to the output and input vectors of any decision-making unit, the ratio of 
weighted output to weighted input should not exceed unity, (ii) the weighted sum of 
inputs should equal unity, (iii) the weight attached to each output should be non-
negative, and (iv) the weight attached to each input should be non-negative. Now this 
is a fairly simple linear programming problem. The complete specification of a DEA 
involves the simultaneous solution of n such programmes - one for each decision-
making unit.  
 
The above arguments may be represented by a suite of linear programming problems. 
Formally, for each k, 
 


















 vik Xij  ≤ 0 ; j = 1, ... , n                       (2) 
 





 vik Xik = 1   9
 
   u rk ≥ 0 ; r = 1, ... , s 
    
   v ik ≥ 0 ; i = 1, ... , m 
 
The optimal value of hk is the efficiency score of the kth decision-making unit. It 
must lie between zero and one; if hk = 1, then k is technically efficient and lies on the 
efficiency frontier. As specified above, the DEA problem is one of output 
maximisation. The corresponding input minimisation problem can be constructed by 
analogous means. 
 
In this paper we obtain the technical efficiencies for each school by specifying a 
constant returns to scale, output maximisation model with radial objectives.
9 
10 The 
non-parametric nature of DEA has a number of implications which ought to be 
emphasised at this stage. First, the standard battery of statistical tests is not 
available.
11 Second, the weights which are assigned to the inputs and outputs in the 
evaluation of technical efficiency are specific to each observation in the sample; that 
is, each decision-making unit (in the present case, each school) is allowed to 
determine the weight vector which maximises its technical efficiency score when 
these weights are applied to each of the decision-making units in the sample. In effect, 
the method gives each school the licence to set its own goals and to be judged in 
accordance with these goals, not according to some exogenously imposed parameters. 
This licence accounts for the considerable appeal of DEA when applied in multi-input 
multi-output contexts without readily observable market prices.
12 Moreover, the 
comparison of (multiple) inputs with (multiple) outputs, which is the cornerstone of 
DEA, allows the efficiencies evaluated by this method to be given a value-added 
interpretation. 
 
Applications of DEA in the context of the evaluation of education providers in the 
primary and secondary sectors are surveyed in Table 1. In the UK, analyses of the 
secondary sector have taken two forms. One type of study involves the evaluation of 
schools within a single Local Education Authority (LEA). Examples of this are 
provided by Norman and Stoker (1991) and Thanassoulis and Dunstan (1994). These 
two studies are unusual in that, in each case, one of the outputs on which the DEA is 
based is a labour market outcome, namely a measure of the employability of leavers. 
In the present study, one of the outputs is the attendance rate of pupils; low rates of 
truancy are supposed to be characteristic of schools which instil in their pupils a sense   10
of social responsibility. We are not aware of any previous studies which have 
included this output. 
 
The second group of studies is based on an analysis of the efficiency of LEAs, cast in 
terms of the output of secondary schools within their jurisdiction. Most of these are 
older studies, conducted using data which preceded many of the recent reforms in the 
administrative structure of compulsory education. Hence their usefulness is 
diminished. Nevertheless, it could be argued that to conduct the exercise at LEA level 
is inappropriate in that this represents too high a level of aggregation – a British LEA 
typically comprises many more schools than an American school district, and it is 
presumably at the level of the school that the greatest inefficiencies in the use of 
resources are likely to occur. In the UK, adequate school level data only became 
available with the introduction of published performance indicators from 1993. The 
present paper constitutes the first attempt to evaluate, at the appropriate level of 
aggregation, the determinants of technical efficiency of state secondary schools 
throughout the country. 
  
The results of any DEA are likely to be sensitive to the choice of inputs and outputs 
used. In view of the large number of observations (decision-making units) used in the 
present study, the specification of inputs and outputs has to be fairly parsimonious so 
that the computational burden remains manageable.
13 The studies summarised in 
Table 1 have a number of features in common which allow us to infer which inputs 
and outputs ought to be included in the specification of the model. Outputs of the 
education system typically include some measure of examination success, but also in 
some specifications includes other measures such as pupils’ subsequent labour market 
performance. Inputs characteristically include measures of pupil composition such as 
ability on entry and socio-economic characteristics. In addition, measures of 
resourcing are often included, such as pupil-teacher ratio, educational expenditure, 
and the quality of the teaching staff.  
 
In four studies - Ray (1991), Lovell et al. (1995), Kirjavainen and Loikkanen (1998) 
and Mancebon and Mar Molinero (1998) - the exercise is conducted in two stages. In 
the first stage, DEA efficiencies are evaluated, while in the second these same 
efficiencies are explained in a regression analysis. The present paper pursues this 
approach too. An issue then revolves around the decision concerning which variables 
to include in the DEA itself, and which should be reserved for use in the regression 
analysis. Ray reserves environmental variables for the latter and school variables for 
the former. The remaining studies, like ours, do not confine their interest at the second   11
stage to variables beyond the control of the school itself. The study by Kirjavainen 
and Loikkanen is especially notable for two reasons; first, the use of Tobit as the 
estimation method in the second stage, and secondly the use of a jackknife to evaluate 
the robustness of the DEA efficiencies. 
  
The DEA technique produces measures of efficiency which are bounded between 0 
and 100, and this has implications for the methodology which we shall employ in the 
second stage of our analysis. While some authors have eschewed the use of limited 
dependent variable methods in this context, we prefer to estimate a tobit model of the 
determinants of school efficiency. Following Maddala (1987), the model can be 
written as in (3) 
 
        
where yi
* is a latent variable referring to the technical efficiency of schools. However, 
what we actually observe in the data is given by equation (4) 
yi = L1i  if yi ≤ L1i  
yi = yi
*  if  L1i < yi
* < L2i 
yi = L2i  if yi
* ≤ L2i 
L2i and L1i  are the upper and lower limits of the data.  In practice, we have no 
observations at the lower limit and so we estimate a right censored tobit model using 





III. THE  DATA 
The data used in this study are drawn from four sources. First, the School 
Performance Tables, published annually by the DfEE since 1992, which include exam 
results and  truancy rates.
14 Second, unpublished annual Schools' Census (Form 7) 
data which were provided by the DfEE, and contain information on the pupil-teacher 
ratio, school type and the socio-economic background of pupils. Third, data referring 
to LEA expenditure on books and materials and on teachers were also obtained from 
the DfEE. Fourthly, local environmental data, such as the unemployment rate and 
socio-economic composition of each Local Authority District (LAD) level were 
extracted from the National Online Manpower Information Service. A full list of the 
i i i u x y + =
' * β  12
variables used in the statistical analysis, together with some descriptive statistics, is 
provided in the appendix. Special schools are excluded from our analysis because 
their pupils typically do not sit public examinations. Selective grammar schools are 
excluded from the sample but a set of covariates are included to capture cream 
skimming effects within the local education market. In addition we exclude schools 
for which no attendance data are available, so that we are left with a sample of 2657 
schools. 
 
In our specification of the DEA problem, we impose constant returns to scale. This 
allows parsimonious specification of the linear programmes, and permits us to explore 
scale factors during the second (tobit) stage of the analysis.  In order fully to exploit 
the non-parametric properties of the method, radial objectives are invoked. To be 
more specific about the model being evaluated, there are two outputs - the proportion 
of 5+ GCSEs grades A*-C (EXAM) and attendance rate (ATTEND) - and two inputs 
- the proportion of pupils ineligible for free school meals (INELIG) and the 
proportion of qualified teachers (QUALST). It is assumed that each school will seek 
to maximise their outputs given their inputs, which reflect the quality of the raw 
material (i.e. pupils) and the quality of the labour input (i.e. teachers).
15 
 
In the tobit analysis, the x vector in equation (3) can be divided into five groups. 
Firstly, schools are distinguished according to the extent to which they are 
independent of local authority control (TYPE). Grant-maintained schools are at one 
end of the spectrum, completely independent of LEA control, whereas county schools 
(the base group) are subject to substantial LEA interference. Other types of school lie 
between these two extremes.  Secondly, a set of variables are included to capture the 
degree of competition between non-selective schools. This is constructed by counting 
the number of schools between two radii centred around a given school, for instance 
within a 1 kilometre radius, 1-2 kilometres and so on up to 3-5 kilometres (COMP).
16 
We also allow for the presence and proximity of selective schools since they may 
cream skim the market, leaving the less able and less motivated for non-selective 
schools, whose efficiency is thereby reduced. Thirdly, two variables are included to 
capture the gender composition of the school (GENDER), since previous studies have 
shown that girls-only schools typically enjoy better average performance in exams 
than mixed groups (Bradley et al, 1999). Single sex schools may therefore be more 
technically efficient. Fourthly, a number of variables are included to capture the local 
environment in which the school is located (ENVIRON). Population density is 
included to capture a rural-urban effect on technical efficiency. The local 
unemployment rate could raise or lower efficiency depending upon its impact upon   13
pupil and teacher motivation. Schools located in areas with a high proportion of 
professional and managerial workers are likely to be more efficient insofar as greater 
financial and other support is forthcoming for the pupil outside of school. There may 
also be a greater ‘voice effect’ in these localities, insofar as middle class parents exert 
greater pressure on a school to perform well. Fifthly, LEA and school resource 
variables are included in the model (RESOURCE). Expenditure on teachers and 
books are included, and both are measured per pupil at the LEA level. This variable 
captures LEA policy towards the schools over which it has control. It is expected that 
the higher the level of expenditure on teachers the more efficient the school is likely 
to be because of efficiency wage arguments. Expenditure on books should raise 
efficiency through its effect on exam performance. The size of the school is included 
to allow for scale economies (Bradley and Taylor, 1998), whereas the pupil-teacher 
ratio is included since larger average class sizes may reduce efficiency because the 
teacher is spread more thinly.




Measurement of school efficiency   
Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of the 8 schools obtaining the lowest 
DEA efficiency scores in 1993, and also for each of the 8 schools obtaining the 
highest scores.
18 These are instructive, not least because they show very forcefully 
that there is more than one way to be efficient. School 2 has a high proportion of 
pupils achieving success at GCSE. The corresponding proportion for School 4 is very 
low - indeed it is exceeded by most of the bottom 8 schools. But School 4 is 
nevertheless technically efficient because one of its inputs, the proportion of qualified 
staff is also very low.
19 Similarly, school 6 is efficient in spite of a low GCSE score 
because the proportion of pupils ineligible for free school meals is very low. This 
means that school 6 recruits pupils primarily from the lower end of the socio-
economic heirarchy and they are likely to have lower educational attainment on entry. 
Likewise, there is more than one way to be inefficient: the relatively poor 
performance of School 2652 owes much to a relatively high truancy rate, while that of 
School 2650 is clearly due in large measure to poor examination performance. 
 
Only one of the schools which appear in the top 8 in 1993 remains technically 
efficient in 1997. This is not altogether surprising, and does not necessarily reflect a 
decline in absolute performance.
20 Of those in the bottom 8 in 1993, virtually all 
schools improved their relative performance. Again, this is unsurprising. It is easier to 
make gains where most gains remain to be made. There is a clear error-correction   14
type of mechanism at work here, and this is something which we shall investigate 
more formally later in the paper when we control for fixed effects. 
 
We have already discussed the controversy in the literature concerning the 
relationship between school performance and school inputs, and in particular the role 
played by the pupil-teacher ratio. The data reported in Table 2 suggest that there is no 
clear cut relationship between the pupil-teacher ratio and the efficiency of the 
school.
21 In the analysis which follows, we shall investigate this relationship in some 
depth, focusing in particular on non-linearities in the data, and on the issues of 
endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
A popular notion concerning differences in school performance is that environmental 
factors dominate. Our data suggest that this is not the case. The local unemployment 
rate in 1993 was above average for 5 of the top 8 schools, but the exam performance 
of their pupils differed substantially. Furthermore, most of the bottom 8 schools were 
in also in areas which had higher than average unemployment rates.
22 
 
To test the robustness of the efficiency scores obtained from DEA we performed a 
form of sensitivity analysis known as ‘jackknifing’ (Kirjavainen and Loikkanen, 
1998). Each observation with an efficiency score of 100 is dropped in sequence, 
without replacement, and the DEA model is then re-estimated. The correlation 
between the efficiency scores is then calculated. Clearly, this is one way of checking 
the influence of outliers which lie on the frontier, an example of which is school 4 in 
Table 2. The results of this exercise suggest a high level of correlation between the 
efficiency scores, with a range from 0.836 to 0.998 for 1993. We conclude, therefore, 
that the efficiency scores are robust.   
 
The determinants of school efficiency 
In this section we begin by discussing the cross-sectional results from the tobit 
models, and focus upon the way in which the coefficients change through time as the 
quasi-market takes hold. This is then followed by a discussion of the determinants of 
the change in efficiency over the 1993-97 time period.
23 The conceptual question 
addressed here is: are schools in 1997 relatively more efficient compared to their 
peers than they were in 1993? Thus the focus is upon relative rather than absolute 
changes in efficiency. To obtain a picture of the extent of absolute change in school 
efficiency we pool our data 1993 and 1997, and then re-estimate our DEA model. 
   15
Table 3 shows the results for the tobit models. These are estimated using data for all 
schools, with DEA efficiency as the dependent variable. The competition variables  
have the expected effect, so that schools facing greater competition from non-
selective schools tend to be more efficient.
24 This effect picks up over time as quasi-
market forces take hold. Also, within any one year, it is competition from the most 
immediate rivals that has the greatest effect on efficiency. In 1997, for instance, the 
coefficient on R1, which refers to rivals in the immediate proximity of a school, is six 
times greater than that on R35 - rivals in the wider area.
25 There is little systematic 
evidence that cream skimming by selective schools reduces the efficiency of non-
selective schools. Although the coefficients are negative, as expected, they are 
generally insignificant.  
 
The effect of school type on efficiency is strong. A consistent finding is that 
secondary modern schools are less efficient compared to county schools, although the 
strength of this effect fluctuates over time. In contrast, voluntary and grant maintained 
schools, who typically generate resources from a wider number of sources, are far 
more efficient than county schools. Their greater efficiency may be due to the 
discretion that such schools are allowed to select a small proportion of their intake on 
academic criteria; further it may reflect the fact that such schools cannot rely on the 
safety net provided by the LEA to the same extent as county schools. All-girl schools 
are considerably more efficient than co-educational schools, whereas there is no 
statistically significant effect for boys. Given inputs, girls in all-girl schools therefore 
perform better in exams and truant less on average, which may reflect differences in 
school ethos, discipline and organisation, or it may be that girls are simply ‘better’ 
pupils. 
  
Local environmental variables also exert a strong influence upon school efficiency. 
Our results suggest that, after controlling for the quality of staff, pupils and the other 
variables included in the tobit model, the higher the local unemployment rate the 
greater the relative efficiency of a school. This is, at first blush, a counterintuitive 
result. We suspect that it is a consequence of the DEA specification which we have 
chosen. To be specific, high unemployment areas are likely to have a high proportion 
of children in receipt of free school meals. Hence one of the inputs to schools in these 
areas is unusually low. Since the weights assigned to the various inputs and outputs 
are school-specific, the high efficiency score obtained by many schools in high 
unemployment areas likely reflects the fact that, for such schools, the weight attached 
to the proportion of children not on free school meals is unusually high - thus 
allowing these schools to achieve a high efficiency score. This finding allows us to   16
emphasise once more the interpretation of DEA efficiencies as value added indicators. 
However, it is also the case that schools in areas with a higher proportion of 
professional and managerial workers are also more efficient. Pupils from this type of 
family background may receive greater support for their education outside of school, 
insofar as extra resources and a more conducive learning environment is provided. To 
the extent that these parents also take a greater interest in the education of their 
children, they may be less likely to truant.           
 
A key issue is whether resources have any effect upon the efficiency of secondary 
schools. Expenditure on teachers, rather than buildings or administrators, does raise 
efficiency, although the effect is quite small throughout the time period. In 
comparison, expenditure on books per student is generally insignificant.  
 
The higher the pupil-teacher ratio the lower the efficiency score might be expected to 
be because class sizes may rise, thereby reducing the amount of contact between the 
teacher and individual pupils. This may then reduce attainment and, if the costs of 
monitoring attendance rise, then the truancy rate may increase.
26 However, over time 
good schools are likely to attract more and better quality pupils, and so the pupil-
teacher ratio is endogenous. To overcome this problem we instrument the pupil-
teacher ratio using the lagged exam performance of the school, school type and other 
school level variables. The early results are mixed, sometimes positive and and 
sometimes zero, which is in agreement with much early work (Hanushek, 1995). 
However, by the end of the study period the pupil-teacher ratio is negative and 
significant, as expected, suggesting that schools with larger average class sizes were 
less efficient. As a further test we explored the possibility that the link between the 
pupil-teacher ratio and efficiency might be nonlinear by including the square of the 
former as further regessor in the model. The coefficient estimates which resulted 
suggested that a turning point exists but that the second derivative is positive – that is, 
the relationship between pupil-teacher ratio and efficiency is, implausibly, U-shaped.  
This puzzling result implies that the model is not correctly specified as a quadratic, 
and we therefore prefer the linear version of the pupil-teacher ratio variable.
27 
 
Previous research has suggested that larger schools have better exam performance.   
However, larger schools may also find it more difficult to monitor the attendance of 
individual pupils which may then translate into a higher truancy rate. The effect of 
school size on efficiency therefore depends on the net effect of these two influences. 
Our results show that school size had a small positive and stable effect on efficiency 
throughout the period.         17
 
A more demanding test of the effect of competition, and other variables, on school 
efficiency, is to examine their effect on the change in efficiency over the 1993-98 
time period. The results of this exercise are shown in Table 4. The effect of 
competition from non-selective rival schools on efficiency remains strong and works 
in the expected direction. More proximate rivals exert a stronger effect on efficiency 
compared to their more distant rivals. Compared to county schools, grant maintained 
and voluntary assisted schools have experienced the greatest increase in relative 
efficiency, which may be a reflection of their greater independence over resource 
allocation and admissions policies.
28 LEAs that have increased their spending on 
teachers the most have also witnessed a small positive increase in relative efficiency, 
whereas there is no effect from the change in book expenditure per pupil. As 
expected, the change in the pupil-teacher ratio is negative whereas the change in 
school size is positive.    
 
Finally, we include the initial value of technical efficiency (i.e. for 1993) in the model 
to test for the possibility of convergence in efficiency over the period. As the quasi-
market has evolved there is clear evidence of convergence in the relative efficiencies 
of schools. Of course, this does not mean that schools have increased their efficiency 
in absolute terms. To test for this we pool the data for 1993 and 1997 and re-estimate 
the DEA model. The results of this exercise suggest that absolute efficiency has 
increased over the period: the mean change is 1.3% with a standard deviation of 
3.1%).   
 
Figure 3 plots the change in efficiency between 1993 and 1998 against the initial 
(1993) level of technical efficiency. The graph is striking in two respects. First, the 
scatter plot is suggestive of a downward sloping relationship which implies that those 
schools with the lowest relative efficiencies in 1993 tended to gain  most in efficiency 
over the period; this confirms that there has been some degree of convergence over 
time in the performance of schools. Second, there is a marked bunching of 
observations somewhat above zero on the vertical axis. Overall efficiency appears to 
have improved in absolute terms over the period.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of a quasi-market in secondary education has simultaneously given 
parents greater school choice and increased competition for pupils between schools. 
Recent official publications have suggested that raising the performance of the 
education system should be undertaken through individual schools, rather than   18
through any systematic reform of the sector. Current debate revolves around the need 
to improve exam performance and reduce truancy because failing to do so will have 
detrimental economic and social consequences.      
 
In this paper we have used a unique panel data set covering all secondary schools in 
England to calculate their technical efficiency. Using non-parametric techniques, 
schools were allowed to jointly maximise multiple outputs, notably their  exam 
performance and attendance rate. Not surprisingly, the results show that there is more 
than one way to be efficient. There is also evidence that the least efficient schools in 
1993 have improved the most over the time period (1993-97) as the quasi-market 
developed.  These findings have implications for the designation of Education Action 
Zones, insofar as it is possible to identify clusters of inefficient schools, and for 
identifying good practice.  
 
Perhaps more importantly, we have also tried to identify those factors which 
determine school efficiency over a sequence of years (1993 to 1997) and the change 
in efficiency over the period. The results of this exercise are revealing. A particularly 
important finding is that, the greater the degree of competition between schools, the 
more efficient schools tend to become. Moreover, differentials in efficiency between 
the most and least efficient schools appear to narrow in response to competition. 
These effects have strengthened over time, a finding which is consistent with the 
evolution of the quasi-market. Competition between schools is also found to be an 
important determinant of the change in relative efficiency over time. One implication 
of these results is that policymakers should take care when deciding whether to close 
a particular school, since the gains from reduced public expenditure may be 
outweighed by the loss of efficiency in neighbouring schools because of the reduction 
in competition between schools.  
 
Other results reported in detail above also have policy implications. In particular, we 
found some support for the notion that the pupil-teacher ratio negatively affects 
school performance. This is an important result which runs counter to the findings of 
most previous research on educational production functions.  
 
Changes in schools’ relative efficiency were found to depend positively on changes in 
local spending on teachers. Spending on books and related equipment also has a 
positive effect, but our findings suggest that this is much smaller (and less significant) 
than that of expenditure on teachers. We would speculate that the impact of   19
expenditure on teachers might become much stronger once the new policy of 
incentive-based payments to ‘super-teachers’ takes effect.  
 
In common with other studies and much media comment, we have established that 
girls-only schools typically perform better than otherwise similar institutions. Our 
findings on local labour market conditions are somewhat difficult to interpret: a high 
incidence of local unemployment appears to raise school efficiency, but so does a 
highly middle class local population. Some collinearity doubtless remains in our 
environmental regressors. 
 
Finally, we would argue that one aspect of our present study provides unusually 
compelling evidence on an important policy issue: the policy of parental choice which 
successive UK governments have adopted over the last decade is serving significantly 












Figure 1a Relationship between GCSE exam performance and truancy rates 1998. 
 
Proportion of days missed through unauthorised absence. 
























































Figure 1b Relationship between exam performance and truancy rates 1993. 
 
Proportion of days missed through unauthorised absence
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Figure 2 Relationship between GCSE exam performance and the exclusion rate 1997 
 
Exclusion rate (Exclusions / Total pupils)























































Figure 3 Change in absolute efficiency 1993-1998 
 
Absolute efficiency 1993 (from pooled DEA 1993 and 1998)
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Table 1 A Review of Data Envelopment Analyses of Primary and Secondary Schooling   24  25




elementary￿  schools in one 
school district￿ 
•median percentile reading test score of pupils 11 years 
earlier 
•median percentile mathematics test score of pupils 11 
years earlier 
•% Anglo-American 
•% not from low income households 
•attendance rate 
•mobility index 
professional staff per pupil 
•instructional expenditure per pupil 
•job satisfaction of teachers 
•social interaction amongst teachers 
•motivation of teachers and principal 
•friendliness of principal 
•index of teaching methods (ranging from group teaching 
to individualism) 
•median percentile reading test 
score of pupils 
•median percentile mathematics 




used as inputs 
￿Bessent et al. 
(1982)￿ 
elementary￿ schools  in 
Houston￿ 
•mean ITBS score at 2
nd grade 
•mean ITBS score at 5
th grade 
•% non-minority 
•% paying full lunch price 
•attendance rate 
•number of professionals employed per pupil 
•local and state expenditure per pupil 
•federal expenditure per pupil 
•number of special programmes in school 
•% teachers with masters degree 
•% teachers > 3 yrs experience 
•teacher attendance rate 
•mean ITBS score at 3
rd grade 
•mean ITBS score at 6
th grade 
   26
Chalos & 
Cherian (1995)￿ 
Elementary￿ school  districts 
in Illinois￿ 
•% pupils not low income 
•% pupils non-minority 
•pupil attendance rate 
•operating expenditure per pupil 
•% teachers with masters degree 
•mean mathematics IGAP score 
level 6 
•mean mathematics IGAP score 
level 8 
•mean verbal IGAP score level 6 
•mean verbal IGAP score level 8 
 











th graders taking BEST test•net current 
expenditure 
•net assessed valuation 
•number of 8
th grade teachers 
BEST 8






















•secondary school teaching expenditure per pupil 
•% children with non-manual head of household 
•% children living in houses with all standard amenities 
•% ethnicity 
•% ≥ 5 higher grade O-
level/CSE passes 
•% ≥ 6 graded O-level/CSE 
results 
•% ≥ 1 graded results at O-
level/CSE 
 








•secondary school teaching expenditure per pupil 
•% children with non-manual head of household 
•% children not from one-parent families 
•% ethnicity 
•%  ≥ 5 higher grade O-
level/CSE passes 
•%  ≥ 3 graded O-level/CSE 
results 
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sample of 1032 
schools 
throughout 




three separate models used to evaluate (a) resources –eg staff numbers, facilities, books - into services - eg 
number of classes provided in each subject area (b) services into educational outcomes – eg test scores, 
proportion of pupils proceeding to college (c) services into labour market outcomes – eg postsecondary grades, 
higherst education attained, subsequent income in the labour market. Results of first stage DEA then form 













•teaching hours per week 
•non-teaching hours per week 
•experience of teachers 
•education of teachers 
•admission  level 
•educational level of pupils’ parents 
•number of students passing 
grade 
•number of graduates 
•score in compulsory subjects 
(matriculation exam.) 
•score in additional subjects 
(matriculation exam.) 



















•% not on free school meals 
•%successful in SAT2 English 
•% successful in SAT2 science 












•% children from high socio-economic group households 
•% children not from one-parent families 
•% children with head of household unemployed 
•% ≥ 5 higher grades at O-
Level/CSE 
•% ≥ 6 graded O-level/CSE 




secondary one  (unnamed) 
English LEA 
•running costs 
•% children with English as first language 
•% children with no referral to counselling 
•% children with above average scores in aptitude tests 
•exam results 
•% pupils entering employment 




is not based on 
test scores   28




Connecticut￿  •FTE teachers per pupil•FTE support staff per pupil•
FTE administrative staff per pupil 
district average score of 9
th 
























LEAs in the 
outer London 
boroughs￿ 
•% children from high socio-economic group households 
•% children not from one-parent families 
•% children not in poor housing 
•teaching expenditure 
•non-teaching expenditure 
•% ≥ 1 A level pass 
•% ≥ 5 higher grades at O-
Level/CSE 






schools in one 
(unnamed) 
British LEA￿ 
•mean verbal reasoning score on entry•% pupils not on 
free school meals￿ 
•mean GCSE score 





is not based on 
test scores   29
Table 2 Ranking of schools by technical efficiencies and selected characteristics, 1993 and 1997  
 


























































    The top 8 schools in 1993   
School1  100.00  100.00  0.00  .27 .29 .969 .970 .148 .201  .957  .947 
School2  100.00 96.17 -3.83  .90  .88  1.000  1.000  .980  .959  1.000  .976 
School3  100.00  87.59  -12.41  .35 .38  1.000  .995 .200 .566  .990  .959 
School4  100.00  84.99  -15.01  .03 .12 .979 .997 .745 .733  .743  .873 
School5  100.00  91.89  -8.11  .35 .32 .992 .989 .491 .394  .816  .959 
School6  100.00  86.68  -13.32  .07 .16 .977 .959 .098 .354  1.000  .986 
School7  100.00  82.56  -17.44  .63  .64 .997 1.000 .962  .939 .865  1.000 
School8  100.00  98.56  -1.44  .88  .90 .999 1.000 .974  .969 .954 .951 
                    
Median School 
1993 
83.37  75.21  -8.16  .12 .17 .994 .975 .756 .719  .941  .989 
Mean of 
variables 
83.65  79.70  -3.95  .35 .40 .989 .989 .826 .799  .981  .986 
                    
    The bottom 8 schools in 1993 
 
 
School2650  75.41  73.19  -2.22  .06 .14 .977 .957 .916 .787  1.000  .973 
School2651  75.21  76.73  1.52  .19 .33 .945 .990 .762 .755  1.000  1.000 
School2652  75.17  85.50  10.33  .22 .22 .889 .987 .529 .432  1.000  .998 
School2653  74.79  77.34  2.55  .07 .07 .908 .936 .598 .531  1.000  1.000 
School2654  74.63  78.87  4.24  .13 .27 .883 .937 .530 .520  1.000  .995 
School2655  74.59  78.82  4.23  .17 .37 .943 .984 .793 .793  1.000  .961 
School2656  72.75  89.90  17.15  .08 .06 .785 .999 .301 .338  1.000  1.000 
School2657  70.67  83.30  12.63  .06 .08 .822 .933 .486 .355  1.000  1.000   30
Table 2 (continued) 
 




























  The top 8 schools in 1993 
School1  833 824  13.830  14.631  .14  .12  7 
School2  1022 1087  16.321  16.542  .08  .04  3 
School3  1345 1360  14.124  15.314  .14  .12  7 
School4  521 506  15.755  15.587  .14  .11  1 
School5  584 587  14.065  14.736  .15  .13  6 
School6  552 486  13.416  14.375  .10  .08  2 
School7  902 930  16.872  17.425  .14  .10  3 
School8  1005 1007  16.194  15.991  .09  .06  3 
             
Median School 
1993 
1037 904  16.140  15.890  .12  .13  0 
Mean of 
variables 
862 923  15.707  16.343  .12  .10  1.362 
            
  The bottom 8 schools in 1993 
School2650  486 550  16.918  16.745  .10  .07  0 
School2651  500 458  14.966  16.286  .12  .10  0 
School2652  906 695  14.465  14.842  .15  .13  5 
School2653  497 501  15.102  16.259  .12  .10  3 
School2654  887 948  15.212  15.967  .26  .23  6 
School2655  851 985  15.283  16.095  .10  .08  0 
School2656  600 494  13.936  15.282  .12  .10  2 
School2657  434 431  14.690  15.307  .13  .09  4 
Notes: 1=Predicted values of the pupil-teacher ratio; 2= Because there are very few school closures and openings over  
this time period, the number of rival schools is constant over time by construction. 
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Table 3 The determinants of technical efficiency in secondary schools, 1993-98, tobits (maximum likelihood estimates) 
   32  33
  1993 1994  1995  1996 1997 1998 










































































































































































































   34
 
Table 3 (continued) 
 
  1993 1994  1995  1996 1997 1998 






















































































































































































Log  Likelihood -6896.74    -7553.47    -6580.50    -6295.15   -7143.66   -6927.08  
χ
2   666.92 0.000 665.97  0.000  531.50  0.000  598.55 0.000  923.33  0.000 969.09 0.000 
Pseudo R
2 .046    .042    .039    0.045   0.061   0.065  
N  2657  2657    2657    2657   2657   2657    35







R1  0.366 
(0.103) 
0.000 
R12  0.189 
(0.054) 
0.001 
R23  0.126 
(0.045) 
0.006 
R35  0.108 
(0.020) 
0.000 
S1  -0.295 
(0.272) 
0.279 
S12  -0.256 
(0.190) 
0.178 
S23  -0.269 
(0.197) 
0.172 
S34  -0.420 
(0.168) 
0.012 








VoluntaryControlled  -0.093 
(0.335) 
0.781 
VoluntaryAssisted  0.664 
(0.192) 
0.001 
SpecialAgreement  0.789 
(0.492) 
0.109 
GrantMaintained  0.289 
(0.174) 
0.098 
Boys only  0.231 
(0.283) 
0.414 
Girls only  2.742 
(0.263) 
0.000 
Population density  0.019 
(0.005) 
0.000 















∆ School size, 1993-98  0.002 
(0.000) 
0.000 
∆ Expenditure on books 















Table 4 (Continued) 







Efficiency (1993)  -0.511 
(0.017) 
0.000 
Constant  38.741 
(1.359) 
0.000 
R2 .381   
F(24, 2632)  67.64  0.000 
N 2657   
Notes: Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Mean values  
 
Variable  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Efficiency  83.655  81.926 86.418 85.484  79.70  81.99 
R1  0.305       
R12  1.057       
R23  1.478       
R35  4.362       
S1  0.037       
S12  0.071       
S23  0.066       
S34  0.087       
S45  0.090       
Secondary Modern  0.059  0.057 0.056 0.054 0.057 0.057 
Voluntary Controlled  0.030  0.030 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.029 
Voluntary Assisted  0.106  0.099 0.100 0.100 0.100 0.100 
Special Agreement  0.013  0.013 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 
Grant Maintained  0.15  0.17 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 
Boys only  0.045  0.046 0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044 
Girls only  0.056  0.056 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.056 
Unemployment rate  0.12  0.11 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Population density  17.38       
Prof & Manage (%)  0.24       
School size  861.76  884.51 905.04 911.86 922.62 931.01 
Expenditure on 
teachers 
1626.95  1539.54 1624.66 1655.65    
Expenditure on books 
and materials 
97.93  101.92 105.57 101.84     
Pupil-teacher ratio 
(fitted) 
15.71  15.82 15.93 16.23 16.34   
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Table A2 Definition of variables 
   39  40
Variable name  Abbreviated 
name 
Definition￿ 
Inputs in DEA    
Socio-economic background  INELIG  The proportion of pupils ineligible for free schools meals. 
Staff qualifications  QUALST  Qualified staff with formal teaching qualifications excluding 
student teachers. 
Outputs in DEA    
Attendance rate  ATTEND  One minus the proportion of unauthorised absences. 
Examination results￿  EXAM￿  Five or more GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) 
grades A* to C.   
Dependent variable - tobit    
Technical efficiency  -  Measure of technical efficiency from DEA, 1993-97. 
Regressors – tobit    
 TYPE   
County (base)￿  -￿  Maintained by the local education authority (LEA) which has an 
influence on admissions. 
Voluntary Controlled   -  Maintained by the LEA. Usually religious foundation. Appoints 
the governing body. 
Voluntary Aided   -  Maintained by the LEA. 
Special Agreement   -   
Grant Maintained   -  Financed by central government through the Funding Agency for 
Schools. Governing body responsible for admissions.  
SELECTION POLICY    
Comprehensive (base)  -  Non-selective school. 
Secondary Modern  -  Non-selective school, but near to Grammar school. 
 RESOURCE   
Expenditure on teachers pp  -  LEA expenditure on teachers per pupil (£000), 1993-97. 
Expenditure on books pp  -  LEA expenditure on books per pupil (£000), 1993-97. 
Pupil-teacher ratio￿  ￿  The number of pupils in school divided by number of full-time 
equivalent teaching staff. 
School size  -  The number of pupils on the school roll. 
 GENDER   
Mixed (base)   -  Co-educational school. 
Girls only  -  Girls only school. 
Boys only  -  Boys only school. 
 ENVIRON   
Unemployment Rate  -  Unemployment rate in the Local Authority District (LAD) 1993-
97. 
%Professional& Managerial  -  Proportion of adults in professional and managerial occupations in 
the LAD. 
Population Density  -  The population density of the LAD. 
 COMP   
Selective schools  S1  Number of selective schools within 1 kilometre radius. 
  S12  Number of selective schools between 1 – 2 kilometres radius. 
  S23  Number of selective schools between 2 – 3 kilometres radius. 
  S34  Number of selective schools between 3 – 4 kilometres radius. 
  S45  Number of selective schools between 4 - 5 kilometres radius. 
Non-selective schools  R1  Number of non-selective schools within 1 kilometre radius. 
  R12  Number of non-selective schools between 1 – 2 kilometres radius. 
  R23  Number of non-selective schools between 2 – 3 kilometres radius. 
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NOTES 
 
1 Gregg and Machin (1997) show that a poor school attendance record leads to disadvantage in the 
labour market as an adult. 
2 In the long-run, successful schools may wish to expand their scale of operation subject to LEA 
approval. (The latter retain primary responsibility for the planning of the supply of school places 
except in areas where over 80% of places are opted-out (i.e. are Grant Maintained ) in which case the 
role is transferred to the Funding Agency for Schools.) 
3 In the words of the Parent's Charter: "Your choice of school directly affects that school's budget - 
every extra pupil means extra money for the school. So your right to choose will encourage schools to 
aim for the highest possible standards" (p.14). The grouping of a school, which affects the 
headteacher's salary, depends upon pupil numbers. 
4 It also suggests that relatively poor exam performance and high truancy are two indicators of a low 
quality school. 
5 Of course, there may be confounding factors, such as family background. We allow for these in the 
more rigorous analysis which follows. 
6 Some studies have identified a negative relationship between class size and students’ subsequent 
labour market outcomes (Card and Krueger, 1992). 
7 In any event it begs the question of OLS estimated production (or cost) functions as to how positive 
(or negative) residuals should be interpreted. The recent use of the appropriate frontier models in the 
context of cost functions has not hitherto been mirrored in the context of educational production 
functions, though this is something that we attempt in the present paper.  
8 Excellent introductions to DEA may be found in the books by Silkman (1986) and by Norman and 
Stoker (1991). Somewhat more advanced treatments are offered by Ganley and Cubbin (1992) and by 
Färe et al. (1994). 
9 The Warwick DEA package is used to solve the suite of linear programmes. 
10 More recent advances in DEA have involved adaptations of the basic method which allow the 
analysis of situations in which returns to scale are variable (Banker, 1984), and in which the analysis 
may specify priorities thus in some way constraining the input or output weights vectors (Thanassoulis 
and Dyson, 1992). 
11 Banker (1993) attempts to give DEA a statistical foundation, but his approach requires strong 
assumptions and effectively violates the fundamentally non-parametric spirit of DEA. 
12 It ought to be noted at this stage that a substantial literature exists on multi-level modelling of the 
secondary education system. Our model includes variables at school and LEA levels, but not at the 
level of the individual pupil. The absence of the latter is the price which must be paid for adopting the 
DEA approach. It is true (but inevitable) that our approach may suffer aggregation bias; it is equally 
true that the more disaggregated approach of multi-level modelling fails to face the challenge of 
evaluating a multi-input multi-output system.   45
                                                                                                                                                                      
13 The bulk of the literature on DEA confirms that parsimonious specifications are, in any event, to be 
preferred. 
14 The truancy rate data need to be treated with some caution since they might be subject to some 
manipulation by schools. Data from the Youth Cohort Survey suggest that the overall rate of truancy is 
higher than suggested by the figures used here. 
15 The proportion of pupils ineligible for free school meals reflects the socio-economic composition of 
the student body. Many studies have shown that a pupils socio-economic background affects their 
attainment at primary and secondary school (Feinstein, 1998; Feinstein  and Symons, 1997), and so in 
the absence of a measure of prior attainment, the proportion of pupils ineligible for free school meals 
will act as a proxy (Thomas and Mortimore, 1994). Note that we also included the proportion of pupils 
with special educational needs in an earlier specification but this had little effect on the calculated 
efficiencies.   
16 We computed eastings and northings for each school based on postcode, using the Postzon package. 
Hence different values for the radii were assumed and a count made of the number of schools falling in 
the relevant area.  
17 We instrument the pupil-teacher ratio variable since it is endogenous. Good schools attract more 
pupils and so the pupil-teacher ratio will rise in the short-term if schools are reluctant to hire new 
teachers (Bradley et al, 1999). The instruments for the pupil-teacher ratio include the lagged exam 
performance of the school, school type and other school level variables.  
18 To check the plausibility of the technical efficiencies obtained from DEA we consulted the OFSTED 
inspectors reports for the top 8 schools. In each case a high proportion of lessons are deemed to be 
satisfactory or better, the management of the school is good and the ethos of these schools is one of 
support and care for the pupils. The implication is that the educational process is efficient in these 
schools.   
19 This proportion is unusually low. To check the accuracy of the data for this school we obtained an 
OFSTED Inspection Report (1995) which suggests that ‘Recruitment difficulties in the past have 
resulted in some posts being filled by non-qualified staff and a small number of lessons are taught by 
non-specialists.’ Newly qualified staff have subsequently been recruited (see Table 2). This implies 
that the proportion of qualified teaching staff for school 4 is accurate.  
20 DEA measures efficiency relative to the best practice observed within each year. Some researchers 
have conducted dymanic DEA exercises (Lynde and Richmond, 1998). This involves pooling data 
across years and assessing the extent to which technical efficiency varies both across decision-making 
units and over time. We report the results of a similar exercise later in the paper.   
21 Schools at the bottom of the league tables may receive, via the formula funding mechanism, extra 
resources to pay for staff, due to special educational needs of pupils. It is largely for this reason that we 
instrument for the pupil-teacher ratio. 
22 Of the schools deemed technically efficient in 1993, two have a 100 per cent attendance rate. This 
raises an issue concerning bias due to measurement errorin the attendance variable. The jackknife 
results reported later provide us with some reassurance that such bias should not be a cause for 
concern. 
23 1997 was chosen as the endpoint because we do not have School Census data for 1998.  
24 Note that because there are so few censored observations the tobit estimates can be interpreted as 
OLS equivalents. 
25 To check for multicollinearity between the competition and population density variables, we drop 
the latter. There is no effect on the competition variables. 
26 Note, however, the findings of Hanushek (1976) and others. 
27 A reset test confirms that a linear model represents the correct functional form. 
28 These schools may have increased their efficiency by being more selective with respect to ability and 
behaviour. 